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Like Wolves on the Fold The Defence of Rorke Drift Huw LloydJones Books

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Like Wolves on the Fold The Defence of Rorke Drift Huw LloydJones Books

This is a companion book to the author’s, “How can Man die Better” an account of the battle at Isandlwana. In this volume he covers the following battle at Rorke’s Drift. As a retired history teacher with an interest in military history I have read many accounts of the battle and this is a very good one. The author is a retired military office connected with the regiment that served
In the Zulu War. He brings a professional understanding of military matters and an appreciation for the individual soldier. His account of the battle is clear and he makes an effort to clarify the confusion caused by the chaotic personal accounts of the survivors.
However, his virtues are also his weaknesses as a historian. In the end of the book he has a chapter concerned with asking who was responsible for the loses suffered by the 24th regiment particularly the battle of Isandhlawana. He shows a tendency to protect regular army officers and attacks officers outside the club so to speak.
As I noted in his first volume he has a dislike for Lt. Col. Dunford, and generally ignores the poor decisions made by Lt. Col. Pulleine of the 24th. The commander of the invasion Lord Chelmsford was responsible for the plan and the direction of his subordinate commanders. His was the ultimate failure. Pulleine is responsible for the the complete lack of defenses at Isandhlawana.
To argue that the orders were vague is true, but in the military of the Victorian age orders between gentleman officers were often polite and vague. To point out Dunford’s lack of combat experience is a straw-man argument as it hides Pulleine complete lack of combat experience. At the time Dunford was considered one of the most experienced officers in the colony. To argue that he was senior and should have taken command at Isandhlwana seems a poor argument. Yes, he was technically senior, but he was expected to move forward to joint the main column. To take command only to give it up a few days later would create more problems then it solved. I might also point out that Dunford was in command of native troops automatically considered an inferior position to commanding white troops. Was Dunford aggressive and a taker of risks? Clearly he was, but both were qualities much prized at the time and the leaders of the Rorke’s Drift fight were criticized for lacking those qualities.
Ultimately, the he loses at Isandhlwana we’re caused by the most basic military mistakes. The British army underestimated the Zulus. Conditioned by the inherent racism of times and previous success against other African peoples they never believed
the Zulu would attack or do so effectively.
Chelmsford’s plan was too complicated and he lacked the resources to carry it off. A common fault at the time. Pulleine failed to listen to warnings that he should fortify the camp and Dunford the loose cannon tripped the Zulu attack early, but frankly if the Zulu had attacked on their schedule I suspect the result would have been the same.
One thing stands out in the accounts of the two battles. The author does a very good job of disputing the tradition failure at Isandhlwana when the soldiers run out of ammunition. The myth was they ran out because they lacked the special keys to open the ammunition boxes. Snook proves that that was not true. The problem was that here was no system in place to supply the soldiers on the line with fresh ammunition. This is a singular failure of planning which happened also at Rorke’s Drift. It seems strange that such an obvious need was not covered by a procedure in the army. Curious that.


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Like Wolves on the Fold The Defence of Rorke Drift Huw LloydJones Books Reviews

"Like Wolves" was an awesome read. While I was disappointed that the cinema version had little bearing on the truth, the actual events were an even better story. I hope someone converts Colonel snook's book into a movie someday soon.

The American civil war hero of Gettysburg, Joshua Chamberlain said that soldiers leave a part of themselves at every battlefield that those who come behind can feel. I certainly felt a part of those men in this book books.

I have placed Snook in company of my other favorite military authors such as Douglas Freeman, Bruce Catton, and Charles MacDonald. I am looking forward to ready more of his work.
I would repeat my comments from my review of How Can A Man Die Better, Both books are well worth reading. I would recommend if you read one, you also get this companion book to finish the complete tale of these battles between the British Army and the Zulu Nation. Had the Zulu nation had more modern weapons, no British soldier would have survived and the slaughter would have been over quicker and been more complete.
A splendid book by a true expert. Well researched and engagingly written. Many details I was not aware of from other books. It really should be read after the author's book on Isandlwana, otherwise some of the Individuals and actions mentioned here will seem out of place and disconnected. Only one very cautious criticism of Colonel Snook's analysis, offered in the knowledge that I have nowhere near his expertise it does seem to me that he lets Pullein -- the on site commander at Isandlwana-- off pretty easily. The commander did not fortify his camp in any way, and did overextend his line pretty badly. Perhaps Pulleine did not anticipate Durnford's sudden withdrawal, which turned his right flank, and perhaps he did not anticipate the collapse of the weak native troops in the center, but perhaps he SHOULD have anticipated these events. Durnford was known to be, shall we say, mercurial, and the NNC was poorly equipped and psychologically overwhelmed. Other than this quibble, again offered deferentially, Col. Snook's analysis seems sound and insightful. His account of Rorke's Drift is marvelous.
This account of the defense of Rorke's Drift is better than any I have read. As a career Marine, with time as a combat rifleman, and always outnumbered, I have always paid particular attention to accounts of determined defenses. Rorke's Drift is a classic of that genre. LtCol Snook goes beyond the acts of individual heroism to reveal the teamwork of the officers and men, which in the end saved the day. Nor does he leave out the bravery of the Zulu warriors either. (If you don't think they were brave, try charging into the face of a 45 caliber Martini-Henry rifle operated by a trained soldier who can get off an aimed round every 7 to 8 seconds. And do it carrying a leather shield and a spear!)
If all you know of Rorke's Drift comes from the Sir Stanley Baker movie "Zulu", then you don't know the true story. There was no bickering between Lts Chard and Bromhead, there were no Welsh singers competing with the Zulu impi's chants. It was raw, it was deadly and most of all, it was a very close thing. Defeat was always near at hand. Read this book and also LtCol Snook's "How Can Man Die Better?" about the disaster at Isandlwana and you will come away with a better understanding of the Anglo-Zulu War. Mike Snook has walked the ground and used both his military experience and familiarity with the latter day version of the "24th of Foot" to tell B Company's story. I salute you sir for helping to keep the memory of those brave men on both sides alive.
This is a companion book to the author’s, “How can Man die Better” an account of the battle at Isandlwana. In this volume he covers the following battle at Rorke’s Drift. As a retired history teacher with an interest in military history I have read many accounts of the battle and this is a very good one. The author is a retired military office connected with the regiment that served
In the Zulu War. He brings a professional understanding of military matters and an appreciation for the individual soldier. His account of the battle is clear and he makes an effort to clarify the confusion caused by the chaotic personal accounts of the survivors.
However, his virtues are also his weaknesses as a historian. In the end of the book he has a chapter concerned with asking who was responsible for the loses suffered by the 24th regiment particularly the battle of Isandhlawana. He shows a tendency to protect regular army officers and attacks officers outside the club so to speak.
As I noted in his first volume he has a dislike for Lt. Col. Dunford, and generally ignores the poor decisions made by Lt. Col. Pulleine of the 24th. The commander of the invasion Lord Chelmsford was responsible for the plan and the direction of his subordinate commanders. His was the ultimate failure. Pulleine is responsible for the the complete lack of defenses at Isandhlawana.
To argue that the orders were vague is true, but in the military of the Victorian age orders between gentleman officers were often polite and vague. To point out Dunford’s lack of combat experience is a straw-man argument as it hides Pulleine complete lack of combat experience. At the time Dunford was considered one of the most experienced officers in the colony. To argue that he was senior and should have taken command at Isandhlwana seems a poor argument. Yes, he was technically senior, but he was expected to move forward to joint the main column. To take command only to give it up a few days later would create more problems then it solved. I might also point out that Dunford was in command of native troops automatically considered an inferior position to commanding white troops. Was Dunford aggressive and a taker of risks? Clearly he was, but both were qualities much prized at the time and the leaders of the Rorke’s Drift fight were criticized for lacking those qualities.
Ultimately, the he loses at Isandhlwana we’re caused by the most basic military mistakes. The British army underestimated the Zulus. Conditioned by the inherent racism of times and previous success against other African peoples they never believed
the Zulu would attack or do so effectively.
Chelmsford’s plan was too complicated and he lacked the resources to carry it off. A common fault at the time. Pulleine failed to listen to warnings that he should fortify the camp and Dunford the loose cannon tripped the Zulu attack early, but frankly if the Zulu had attacked on their schedule I suspect the result would have been the same.
One thing stands out in the accounts of the two battles. The author does a very good job of disputing the tradition failure at Isandhlwana when the soldiers run out of ammunition. The myth was they ran out because they lacked the special keys to open the ammunition boxes. Snook proves that that was not true. The problem was that here was no system in place to supply the soldiers on the line with fresh ammunition. This is a singular failure of planning which happened also at Rorke’s Drift. It seems strange that such an obvious need was not covered by a procedure in the army. Curious that.